



VOX POPULI ON THE
**'GRAND
FINALE'**
BETWEEN
KOSOVO AND SERBIA
VOLUME III

March 2020

Supported by:



Norwegian Embassy



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***Vox Populi* on the ‘Grand Finale’ between Kosovo and Serbia**

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Executive Summary

This survey aimed to understand the perceptions and attitudes of citizens (*Vox Populi*) regarding the scenarios on the 'grand finale' between Kosovo and Serbia. This survey is the continuation of the first and second surveys, which were conducted between 17-26 December 2018 and 21-28 May 2019, respectively. The fieldwork for the third survey was completed between 20-24 January 2020. A total of 1107 respondents in our survey (90% Albanians, 8% Serbs, and 2% from other ethnic groups) made our sample nationally representative of the Kosovo population. A preliminary questionnaire was first administered to a pilot group in order to make final adjustments to the questionnaire.

In this survey, *simple proportional sampling* was used for each municipality, based on the municipality population size. With a sample size of 1107, estimates have a sampling error of plus or minus 3 percentage points (at the five percent level of significance). However, confidence intervals for estimates based on subsets of the sample, such as the Serb sample of 93 respondents, will be considerably larger.

In terms of the results, in the subsequent paragraphs, we present the findings on the following topics:

- i) restarting or not restarting the dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia;
- ii) in the event of a final deal between Kosovo and Serbia, should Kosovo seek to join Albania;
- iii) the perception of Kosovo's citizens related to **three scenarios** for an eventual deal between Kosovo and Serbia; and
- iv) the underlying reasons for support or lack of support related to the scenarios for an eventual deal between Kosovo and Serbia.

The first group of findings shows that the majority of the Kosovo population support *the restart of dialogue* between Kosovo and Serbia. Overall, **70%** of respondents support the restart of dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia. Both

Kosovo Albanians and Serbs agree that the dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia should restart, although the Serbian respondents were somewhat less enthusiastic than the Albanians.

The second group of the findings focused on the issue of whether Kosovo should seek to join Albania if Kosovo is recognized by Serbia. In this context, the opinion in contrast to the previous survey has sharply declined, overall, **37%** supporting the idea that *Kosovo should seek unification with Albania* if Kosovo is recognized from Serbia and with **54%** rejecting the idea. Albanians expressed somewhat similar opinions (although Serbian respondents were less likely to have a view on this topic). The second group of findings also focused on potential reasons to join or not join Albania. These are the results about the reason that Kosovo **should seek** unification with Albania:

- To realize the dream of some Albanians to live within a single state (85% of Albanian versus 44% of the Serbian sample);
- Create a more prosperous state and environment for all Albanians (87% of Albanian versus 22% of the Serbian sample);
- Stabilize and bring peace to the Balkan region forever (68% of Albanian versus 22% of the Serbian sample).

Below are the results about the reason that Kosovo **should not seek** unification with Albania:

- It is rather better that Kosovo acts as a separate state in the international area (97% of Albanian versus 16% of the Serbian sample);
- The prosperity of Kosovo can be undermined by such a move (75% of Albanian versus 30% of the Serbian sample);
- It would not be fair to other Albanians who live in other countries in the region (70% of Albanian versus 32% of the Serbian sample).

The third and final group of the findings is linked with the perceptions and preferences of Kosovo's citizens and potential reasons for supporting or lack of support for **three alternative scenarios** for an eventual deal between Kosovo and Serbia.

Thus, regarding *the first scenario– the status quo*–only a small number of participants (**12%**) were satisfied with the current status quo between Kosovo and Serbia. However, there were substantial differences between the Albanian and Serbian samples, with **90%** among Albanians compared with **43%** among Serbs who were dissatisfied with the current status quo. The main reasons that respondents were **satisfied with the current status quo** were:

- At least there is peace between Kosovo and Serbia (65% of Albanian versus 49% of the Serbian sample);
- At least prevents expulsion of Serbs from Kosovo (35% of Albanian versus 37% of the Serbian sample);
- It keeps the door open for maintaining strong Serbian influence in some parts of Kosovo (17% of Albanian versus 47% of the Serbian sample);
- At least we have economic prosperity (30% of Albanian versus 16% of the Serbian sample);
- There are good working relationships with the EU and the UN (40% of Albanian versus 12% of the Serbian sample).

In contrast, the reasons that respondents were **not satisfied with the current status quo** were:

- Kosovo cannot have concrete moves to European integration (85% of Albanian versus 10% of the Serbian sample);
- We cannot achieve global recognition of Kosovo (75% of Albanian versus 15% of the Serbian sample);
- There cannot be economic prosperity (62% of Albanian versus 18% of the Serbian sample);
- Kosovo cannot have peaceful relations with Serbia (57% of Albanian versus 23% of the Serbian sample);
- Kosovo cannot solve internal problems between the Serb and Albanian communities (60% of Albanian versus 50% of the Serbian sample).

As to *the second scenario– granting executive powers for the Kosovo Serb Association/community' provided that in return, Serbia provides de facto*

recognition to Kosovo – only a small minority of respondents (**15%**) supported this scenario. There was weak support among Kosovo Albanians (**11%**), but significantly more support among Serbs (**53%**) to grant executive powers to the Kosovo Serb association. The reasons that respondents **agree with granting extended executive powers to the Kosovo Serb Association/community** were:

- It will improve the economic prosperity in Kosovo (72% of Albanian versus 28% of the Serbian sample);
- It will give Serbs who live in Kosovo more say in the decision-making process (50% of Albanian versus 68% of the Serbian sample);
- It will improve the integration of the Serbian community in Kosovo (49% of Albanian versus 49% of the Serbian sample);
- It will improve relationships with Serbia (47% of Albanian versus 34% of the Serbian sample).

Furthermore, the reasons that respondents **do not agree with granting extended executive powers to the Kosovo Serb Association/community** were:

- It will entrench divisions among communities in Kosovo (84% of Albanian versus 38% of the Serbian sample);
- It will increase the political tensions between Kosovo and Serbia (79% of Albanian versus 33% of the Serbian sample);
- It will open the door for establishing a mini Republika Srpska in Kosovo (86% of Albanian versus 25% of the Serbian sample);
- It will make it harder to achieve economic prosperity for Kosovo (55% of Albanian versus 21% of the Serbian sample);

Regarding **the third scenario- border adjustment between Kosovo and Serbia in return for global recognition of Kosovo and open the path for UN membership**, the following findings were obtained: **30%** of the total sample expressed support for this scenario, the level of support rising to 40% among the Serbian sample.

We have also examined in more depth the overall structure of attitudes. Findings show that there are, in essence, three main clusters of attitudes. **The first cluster** includes satisfaction with the status quo, its continuation for 5 more years, restarting the dialogue, and making every effort to find a solution. Respondents tend to have somewhat consistent attitudes towards these four issues: for example, those who are dissatisfied with the status quo are unlikely to support its continuation for 5 more years. They also tend to believe that the government should restart the dialogue and should make every effort to find a solution. **The second** includes granting executive power for the KSA, and border adjustment in order to achieve global recognition. Moreover, **the third** contains a single issue - unification with Albania.

Within each cluster, people tend to have rather consistent attitudes, but it is a different story **between** clusters: knowing where someone stands on issues within the first cluster is not a good guide to where they will stand on issues within the second cluster. Thus, people may agree on the need to restart the dialogue and to make every effort to achieve a resolution, but disagree on what particular arrangements should be made between Serbia and Kosovo. Finally, attitudes towards unification with Albania tend to stand apart from attitudes towards all the other issues. Unification is not closely aligned with any of the other issues. To put it another way, people who support unification are almost equally likely to be drawn from those who are satisfied with the status quo and those who are dissatisfied, and from those who favour border adjustment and those who do not.

Comparative analysis of the three surveys related to the *three scenarios* enables us to make definitive conclusions. Results about the status quo (**scenario 1**) show that dissatisfaction with the current status quo between Kosovo and Serbia increased between the first and second surveys, and remains very high in the third survey. Continuing high levels of dissatisfaction are particularly marked among the Albanian samples, but there tends to be a much lower level of dissatisfaction, and higher volatility, in the Serbian samples. Similarly, overall results about granting extended executive powers for the Kosovo Serb Association/community (KSA) provided that in return Serbia provides de facto recognition to Kosovo

(scenario 2) show that there continues to be overwhelming opposition to this scenario with over four-fifths of each sample being against the scenario. The Albanian samples show a stable high level of opposition to executive powers for the KSA, while in contrast, the Serbian samples show a significant increase in support for extended executive powers. Overall results about border adjustment, which would result in the global recognition of Kosovo and opened the path for UN membership **(scenario 3)**, remain relatively stable although there appears to be increased support among Serbs. It should also be noted that there have been quite large proportions of the Serb samples (around a fifth) who 'do not know/do not have a view'.

In brief, the perspectives of the two communities continue to differ quite fundamentally in some respects: the Serb respondents showed particular concern about internal issues affecting the Serb community while the Albanian respondents, while undeniably worried about the risks of developing a mini Republika Srpska, were also concerned about external issues-particularly integration with the EU and global recognition.

In conclusion, the *vox populi* of the people of Kosovo is that there should be change. The people do not want the status quo to continue, and they want the government to make every effort to reach a final agreement with Serbia. However, there is no clear message from the people (either from the Albanian or the Serbian community) on how to achieve change. Each of the three scenarios has notable downsides in the view of public opinion. Nevertheless, at the same time, this does not rule out the possibility of public support for an agreement brokered by the USA and Europe. Given the public's keenness to end the stalemate and to secure international recognition and European integration, an agreement that achieved these goals could well be successful.

1. Introduction

The first and second surveys, *Vox Populi* on the 'Grand Finale' between Kosovo and Serbia, were conducted between 17-26 December 2018 and 21-28 May 2019, respectively. Following each survey, separate reports were published, and findings were presented via conferences with several target groups. As with the first and second surveys, the present survey aimed at understanding the perceptions and attitudes of the citizens regarding the scenarios on the 'grand finale' between Kosovo and Serbia. We conducted this third survey - *Vox Populi* on the 'Grand Finale' between Kosovo and Serbia (Volume III) - between 20-24 January 2020. Thus, the objective of the survey was to understand in depth the motives and the attitudes of the citizens regarding the scenarios on the eventual Final Deal between Kosovo and Serbia. Another aim of this research, based on repeated cross-sectional data, was to examine whether there were any changes with respect to the public support, or the lack of support, for different scenarios on the so-called 'grand finale'.

For nearly a decade, the Kosovo-Serbia dialogue has been facilitated by the EU, and several agreements have been reached. While substantial progress has been achieved in terms of freedom of travel, border management, protection of the religious and cultural heritage, and the integration of police, many other agreements have not been implemented or only partially implemented by both countries.¹

Nonetheless, despite the progress and problems of the process of the dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia, the dialogue has been halted since November 2018. This was because the Kosovo government imposed a 10% tariff on all the imports from Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, and this decision followed with 100%

¹ European Commission (2013) 'Serbia and Kosovo*: historic agreement paves the way for decisive progress in their EU perspectives', Press Release, 22 April. Available at: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-13-347_en.htm (Accessed on: 25/02/2020).

tariffs on all Serbian and Bosnian goods.² The government of Kosovo has excused this decision as a response to the Serbian government for its aggressive policy in the international arena against Kosovo's integration into international organizations such as INTERPOL. The tariff has caused a broad reaction by domestic and international actors, including the EU and the USA. EU and US representatives have urged an immediate suspension of the tariff on imports from Serbia and Bosnia, considering it as a necessary measure to restore momentum to the dialogue process. The newly established government in Kosovo has warned that a 100% tariff on Serbian goods will be lifted but replaced with measures of reciprocity.³ It remains to be seen whether this step will bring parties back to dialogue or remain in hostile positions.

The normalization of relations between the two countries remains top of the agenda for the EU and the US. This was reaffirmed in Berlin on April 29, 2019, in an event initiated by German Chancellor Angela Merkel and French President Emmanuel Macron.⁴ Although the meeting aimed to restore the dialogue, yet it remains blocked due to non-suspension of the tariff. The Berlin meeting has produced conflicting positions on the manner of the continuation of the dialogue. Political debate continues on the imposed tariffs and the possible scenarios for the eventual Final Agreement between Kosovo and Serbia. Since March 2019, Germany and France have played a more active role in the dialogue, while more recently, the US-appointed, a special envoy for the Kosovo-Serbia dialogue.⁵

Notwithstanding the complex history and current context of the dialogue, based on discussions and analysis of different policymakers and relevant stakeholders both in Kosovo and Serbia and at the international level, different potential

² Radio Free Europe (2018) 'Kosovo increases the customs tax for Serbia and Bosnia to 100 percent', 21 November. Available at: <https://www.evropaelire.org/a/rritet-taksa-per-produktet-serbe-/29613129.html> (Accessed on: 05/02/2020).

³ The Guardian (2019) 'EU running scared from fascism, says Kosovo's likely new PM', 21 October. Available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/oct/21/kosovo-likely-new-leader-albin-kurti-condemns-eu-balkans-policy> (Accessed on: 06/02/2020).

⁴ European Western Balkans (2019) 'Germany to restart the Serbia-Kosovo dialogue with the Berlin meeting'

⁵ Balkan Insight (2019) 'New US envoy delights Kosovo, leaves Serbia surprised', 4 October. Available at: <https://balkaninsight.com/2019/10/04/new-us-envoy-delights-kosovo-leaves-serbia-surprised/> (Accessed on: 06/02/2020).

scenarios for an eventual Final Agreement can be outlined. These scenarios, to name a few, entail: executive powers for the Serb Association/community; border adjustments between Kosovo and Serbia; 'two Germany's model', and so forth. In this context, the present research report aims to outline and deconstruct the extent of public support among Kosovo citizens for possible scenarios on the comprehensive Final Agreement that would be legally binding between Kosovo and Serbia.

This research report, besides other issues, provides a detailed analysis of the findings on the main potential scenarios for a final agreement between Kosovo and Serbia, and the motives that drive the citizens towards, or away from, any particular scenario. It focuses on three main potential scenarios: a) continuation of the status-quo; b) de facto recognition from Serbia, in exchange for extended executive powers for the Kosovo Serb Association/community; and c) border adjustment between Kosovo and Serbia in return for global recognition for Kosovo and a concrete pathway for UN membership.

In addition to that, the research report analyses the citizen's support for the restart of the dialogue. While these are some of the key issues and scenarios examined in this research report, a number of potential variants and options will also be discussed.

2. Methodology

2.1. Survey Design

The questionnaire consisted of closed-ended questions with the following structure: demographic data about the participants, their perception/understanding, attitudes, and support, or lack of support, for the potential Scenarios/Options for the Final Agreement/Deal between Kosovo and Serbia. The questionnaire was first administered to a pilot group of 30 respondents in order to test its comprehensibility for respondents and make final adjustments to the questionnaire.

2.2. Survey Procedure

The research team consisted of 14 field interviewers (2 for each of the 7 regions of Kosovo, plus two special interviewers for Serb respondents in Kosovo) and 4 researchers, Key Expert and 2 Senior Experts, and a junior researcher. Their work resulted in the current research report. Field interviewers administered the questionnaires with tablets using specially-designed software for this survey. The questionnaire was filled by field interviewers to ensure that there were no missing data. However, the respondents were free not to respond to the questions. In order to avoid interviewing bias, the research team trained all field interviewers in conducting the survey.


In order to check the work of interviewers during data collection, about 41% (a total of 450 respondents) were re-interviewed. This back-check was done chiefly through phone interviews and a few field visits. As a check, the respondents were asked around 5 questions based on the original interview. The checklist served as a tool for compliance review with the principle of a randomized selection of respondents (covering a selection of locality, starting point, house unit, and selection of the respondent). Responses from the first and second interviews were compared. In addition to the usual screening process, a logical control of the filled-in questionnaires was carried out.

2.3. Sampling

The survey was carried out in 38 Kosovo municipalities within the 7 main regions of Kosovo, namely Pristina, Ferizaj, Gjilan, Prizren, Peja, Gjakova, and Mitrovica (North and South, see the map below). Kosovo has a population of 1,798,506 inhabitants⁶. In this survey, simple proportional sampling was used for each municipality based on municipality population size, which is on the ratio of the number of registered population in a specific municipality to the total number of registered inhabitants in Kosovo. The resulting ratio determines the weight of

⁶ Kosovo Agency of Statistics (2018) "Statistical Yearbook of the Republic of Kosovo 2018". Available at: <http://ask.rks-gov.net/media/4369/statistical-yearbook-2018.pdf> (Accessed on: 06/02/2020).

each municipality in the sample. The baseline of the registered population was derived from the Kosovo Statistical Agency.



The questionnaires were administered in respondents' houses and apartments. A random route sampling procedure was used to determine the study sample, with prescribed rules for the choice of the starting point, and the subsequent selection of street, building, apartment, and respondent. The questionnaire was administered to only one family member. This was done as such in order to avoid bias in the sample.


In order to obtain a sufficiently large sample of Serbs for useful analysis, the two major predominantly Serbian municipalities Mitrovica North (in the north of Kosovo) and Graçanica (in the South of Kosovo) were oversampled. This yielded

a sample of 93 Serbian respondents instead of the 50 respondents that would have been obtained without oversampling.

2.4. Sample Characteristics

The total number of respondents is 1107. With a sample of this size, estimates will have a sampling error of plus or minus 3 percentage points (at the five percent level of significance). Note, however, that the sampling error will be considerably larger when estimates are just for the Serb sample of 93 respondents: with a sample of 93, the 95% confidence interval will be approximately plus or minus 10 percentage points. All differences between the Serb and Albanian samples have therefore been checked for statistical significance.

As noted above, the study has been conducted across all (seven) Kosovo regions and (thirty-eight) municipalities. See below the sample distribution in the seven regions.



Since the number of interviews for each municipality was based on the proportion of the population in each municipality, the distribution of the achieved sample thus corresponds closely to the distribution of the population. See below the table

depicting the size of the population based on data from the Kosovo Agency of Statistics⁷ and the number of interviews per municipality.

Table 1. Population size and the number of interviews per municipality			
No	Municipality	Population	No. of Interviews
1	<i>Ferizaj</i>	<i>103,003</i>	<i>63</i>
2	<i>Shtime</i>	<i>27,654</i>	<i>35</i>
3	<i>Kaçanik</i>	<i>33,409</i>	<i>20</i>
4	<i>Shtërpcë</i>	<i>6,773</i>	<i>8</i>
5	<i>Hani i Elezit</i>	<i>9,998</i>	<i>6</i>
6	<i>Gjakovë</i>	<i>95,340</i>	<i>58</i>
7	<i>Rahovec</i>	<i>59,102</i>	<i>36</i>
8	<i>Deçan</i>	<i>41,808</i>	<i>26</i>
9	<i>Junik</i>	<i>6,370</i>	<i>4</i>
10	<i>Gjilan</i>	<i>80,162</i>	<i>48</i>
11	<i>Kamenica</i>	<i>30,750</i>	<i>19</i>
12	<i>Viti</i>	<i>47,615</i>	<i>29</i>
13	<i>Ranillug</i>	<i>3,810</i>	<i>3</i>
14	<i>Novobërdë</i>	<i>7,160</i>	<i>5</i>
15	<i>Partesh</i>	<i>1730</i>	<i>2</i>
16	<i>Kllokot</i>	<i>2,753</i>	<i>2</i>
17	<i>Mitrovicë</i>	<i>69,346</i>	<i>42</i>
18	<i>Vushtrri</i>	<i>64,468</i>	<i>39</i>
19	<i>Mitrovica Veriore</i>	<i>12,211</i>	<i>40</i>
20	<i>Zveçan</i>	<i>7,376</i>	<i>5</i>
21	<i>Zubin Potok</i>	<i>6,616</i>	<i>5</i>
22	<i>Leposaviq</i>	<i>13,587</i>	<i>10</i>
23	<i>Skenderaj</i>	<i>52,343</i>	<i>32</i>
24	<i>Pejë</i>	<i>99,568</i>	<i>61</i>
25	<i>Istog</i>	<i>40,380</i>	<i>11</i>
26	<i>Klinë</i>	<i>40,122</i>	<i>12</i>
27	<i>Prishtinë</i>	<i>211,755</i>	<i>129</i>
28	<i>Obiliq</i>	<i>19,144</i>	<i>12</i>
29	<i>Fushë Kosovë</i>	<i>38,607</i>	<i>24</i>
30	<i>Lipjan</i>	<i>57,733</i>	<i>35</i>
31	<i>Podujevë</i>	<i>83,445</i>	<i>51</i>
32	<i>Glllogoc</i>	<i>61,133</i>	<i>19</i>
33	<i>Graçanicë</i>	<i>12,091</i>	<i>20</i>


⁷Ibid.

34	Prizren	191,565	113
35	Suharekë	60,247	21
36	Malishevë	58,269	37
37	Mamushë	5,950	4
38	Dragash	34,316	21
	Total	1,798,506	1107

90% of the study sample were Albanians, 8% Serbs, and 2% were from other ethnic groups in Kosovo. The Albanian percentage of the sample closely corresponds to that recorded in the 2011 census, which shows that 91% were Albanian, 3.4% Serb, and 5.6% 'Other'. The relatively sizeable Serb proportion in the sample reflects the oversampling of the Serb population. (The small number of 'other' ethnic groups is too small for useful analysis and does not provide a reliable basis for weighting.)

65% of the sample is male, and 35% is female, a considerable over-representation of men. In fact, gender differences in public opinion on the issues covered in this report are quite small. The main gender difference is that women were much more likely to say that they did not follow politics closely. Accordingly, they were also more likely than men to say that they did not have a view and were more likely to give responses such as 'somewhat agree' rather than 'strongly agree' than were men. In order to ensure that we are comparing like with like, we adjust for the over-representation of men in the sample when we compare results from the three surveys later in this report.

The mean age of the sample is 40 years old, and the age range is 18-83 years old. Below is the distribution of the sample by age group.



Regarding education level, about 1% of the sample reported having no school degree, 4% reported elementary education only (1-5 classes), 9% reported lower secondary education (6-9 classes), 46% upper secondary school (gymnasium or vocational), 6% the post-secondary vocational education, 30% reported a university (Bachelor) degree, and 5% with a Master's degree.

Regarding the employment level of our sample, 56% reported having been employed at the time of the interview, 22% unemployed, 7% of students, 7% retired, 5% fulfilling domestic tasks, and some unspecified. Concerning employment categories, 13% reported to have been professional or in technical occupations (e.g., doctor, teacher, engineer, artist, accountant, etc.), 4% higher administrator occupations (e.g., banker, an executive in big business, government official, etc.), 6% clerical occupations (e.g., secretary, office manager, bookkeeper, etc.), 20% sales occupations (e.g., sales manager, shop owner, etc.), 7% skilled worker (e.g., motor mechanic, electrician, etc.), 5% semi-skilled worker (e.g., bus driver, carpenter, etc.), 3% unskilled worker (e.g., labourer, porter, etc.), 3% farm worker (e.g., farmer, farm labourer, etc.), 13% students, 11% housewives, and 17% unspecified.

2.5. Data analysis

Participants' responses were entered into SPSS. Descriptive statistics, such as frequencies and cross-tabulations by ethnic groups, were used to analyse the data. We have also checked whether results varied by age, gender, educational level, and employment situation.


3. Findings: The way forward or backward

This section outlines the findings of this survey under three headings: **(i)** restarting or not restarting the dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia; **(ii)** in the event of a final deal between Kosovo and Serbia, should Kosovo remain independent or join Albania; and **(iii)** the perception of Kosovo's citizens related to the *three scenarios* for an eventual deal between Kosovo and Serbia (including the underlying reasons for support or lack of support related to the three scenarios).


3.1. Restarting the dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia

About this issue, the following question was asked: **Would you support restarting of dialogue between the governments of Kosovo and Serbia?**

The findings concerning this issue were as follows: 27% responded with 'not at all' or 'very little' in support for restarting the dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia. About 70% of the sample responded with either 'somewhat' or 'very much' in agreement with restarting the dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia. Approximately 4% among participants 'do not know/do not have a view' on this issue. There is, therefore, a clear balance in favour of restarting the dialogue.



Assessment of responses for the Albanian and Serbian samples reveals a somewhat similar pattern of responses: 27% among Albanians and 30% among Serbs either 'very little' or 'not at all' agree with restarting the dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia. 70% among Albanians and 66% among Serbs either 'somewhat' or 'very much' agree with restarting the dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia. However, as can be seen, the Serb respondents are more likely to choose the intermediate categories of 'somewhat' or 'very little' in favour rather than the extreme categories of 'very much' or not at all in favour (differences statistically significant at the 0.01 level). In other words, Serb respondents are rather less enthusiastic than the Albanian respondents about restarting the dialogue. 3.5% among Albanians and 4% among Serbs 'do not know/do not really have a view' about this issue.




3.2. Should Kosovo seek unification with Albania?


Turning next to the question of whether Kosovo should join Albania, the survey posed the following question:

If Kosovo is recognized by Serbia, should Kosovo seek unification with Albania?

37% of the total sample responded with Kosovo either 'definitely should' or 'probably should' seek unification with Albania if it is recognized by Serbia. 54% responded that Kosovo either 'definitely should not' or 'probably should not' seek unification with Albania if it is recognized by Serbia. 9% among participants 'do not know/do not have a view' on this issue.




Evaluation of responses of the Albanian and Serbian samples reveals a contrasting (and very significantly different) pattern of responses, however: 40% among Albanians and 10% among Serbs responded with Kosovo either 'definitely should' or 'probably should' seek unification with Albania if it is recognized by Serbia. 55% among Albanians and 47% among Serbs responded with Kosovo either 'probably should not' or 'definitely should not' seek unification with Albania if it is recognized from Serbia (see the graph below). 5% among Albanians and 43% among Serbs 'do not know/do not really have a view' about this issue.




In a series of follow-up questions, the survey sought to understand the respondents' underlying reasons for why Kosovo should or should not seek

unification with Albania. We show below the differences between Albanians and Serbs regarding the underlying reasons that Kosovo should seek unification with Albania. These questions were asked only to respondents who responded with Kosovo either 'definitely should' or 'probably should' seek unification with Albania if it is recognized by Serbia (40% Albanians and 10% Serbs having responded affirmatively about unification):



As can be seen, of respondents who were in favour of unification, the Albanians generally held positive views of the economic, political, and aspirational benefits of unification, whereas Serbs were markedly less positive about these three reasons.

Turning next to the reasons for not seeking unification, the respondents who had responded that Kosovo either 'definitely should not' or 'probably should not' seek unification with Albania were asked a parallel but somewhat different series of follow-up questions (remember 55% of Albanians and 47% of Serbs did not want to seek unification and hence were asked these particular follow-up questions):



Here we can see that the Albanian respondents who were opposed to unification were particularly likely to see international advantages to having two states and were considerably less mindful of economic benefits. Serbian respondents, on the other hand, were more attracted to the argument that unification might destabilize the region.


3.3. The *three scenarios* for an eventual deal between Kosovo and Serbia

Participants were exposed to the following options/alternatives for an eventual deal between Kosovo and Serbia: a) continuation of the status quo; b) de facto recognition from Serbia, and with extended executive powers for the Kosovo Serb Association/community; and c) border adjustment between Kosovo and Serbia in return for global recognition of Kosovo, and opening the path for UN membership.

To clarify, interviewers explained to respondents, and it was also written down in the survey, what was meant by 'the status quo'⁸, and by 'de-facto' and 'extended executive powers'⁹.

3.3.1. First scenario: Continuation of the status quo

Regarding the first scenario, respondents were asked the following question: How satisfied are you with the current status quo between Kosovo and Serbia? About 12% of the total sample responded with either 'very much satisfied' or 'somewhat satisfied' about the current status quo between Kosovo and Serbia (see the chart below). Three-quarters of participants (75%) responded with 'not at all satisfied' about the current status quo between the two countries while a further 10% responded 'very little satisfied'. 3% responded with 'do not know/do not really have a view' on this issue.




However, a separate analysis of Albanian and Serbian sample reveals a somewhat different pattern of responses within the two communities. 8% among the Albanian sample and 46% among Serbs are either 'very much satisfied' or


⁸By status quo, I mean lack of mutual recognition and pending political and diplomatic relations between Kosovo and Serbia.

⁹By de facto recognition, I mean that Serbia recognizes Kosovo's institutions but it will not recognize Kosovo's statehood; by extended executive powers, I mean powers that would include constitutional change in Kosovo and would create new political entity in Kosovo, that would be a semi-autonomous entity.

'somewhat satisfied' with the current status quo between Kosovo and Serbia. 90% among Albanians compared with 43% among Serbs are either 'very little satisfied' or 'not at all satisfied' with the current status quo between Kosovo and Serbia (see the graph below). 2% among Albanians and 11% among Serbs responded with 'do not know/do not really have a view' about the current status quo between Kosovo and Serbia. [This is consistent with the findings reported above that the Serb sample was less enthusiastic about restarting the dialogue.]




Then, we proceeded with a number of follow-up questions about the underlying reasons why respondents were or were not satisfied with the current status quo between Kosovo and Serbia. Respondents who responded with either 'very much satisfied' or 'somewhat satisfied' with the current status quo between Kosovo and Serbia, responded in the following way (see the graph below) regarding the underlying reasons why they were satisfied with the current status quo (remember that only 8% of the Albanian compared with 46% of the Serb samples were satisfied and hence were exposed to these particular follow-up questions, so the Albanian responses are based on tiny numbers):




As can be seen, among both Albanian and Serbian respondents, ‘at least there is peace between Kosovo and Serbia’ was the most often cited reason for maintaining the status quo. In contrast, ‘It keeps the door open for ... Serbian influence.’ was much more often cited by Serbian than by Albanian respondents.

We turn next to the respondents who were either ‘not at all satisfied’ or ‘very little satisfied’ with the current status quo between Kosovo and Serbia. These respondents were asked a parallel but differently-worded set of follow-up questions. Remember that the vast majority of Albanian (90%) and many from the Serb (43%) samples were dissatisfied with the status quo and hence were asked this series of questions:




As can be seen, the Albanian respondents were most likely to cite absence of concrete moves towards European integration as their reason for dissatisfaction, followed closely by lack of global recognition, lack of economic prosperity, lack of a solution to internal problems between the two communities, and lack of recognition by Serbia. Serbian respondents had very different priorities; however, mainly focusing on the unresolved internal problems between the two communities.

Regarding the status quo scenario, we also asked respondents the following question: Would you support the continuation of the status quo for the next *five* years? Just as there is no satisfaction with the current status quo among respondents, there is also 'not at all' (70%) and 'very little' (10%) support for the continuation of the status quo for the next five. The cross-tabulation analysis reveals that respondents (75%) who responded with 'not at all' or 'very little' for the continuation of the current status quo also responded with 'not at all' or 'very little' for the continuation of the current status quo for the next five years.




However, the analysis of responses for the Albanian and Serbian sample reveals a very different pattern of responses. 16% among Albanian sample and 55% among Serbs responded with 'somewhat' or 'very much' support for the continuation of the status quo for the next five years. 83% Albanians compared with 40% Serbs responded with 'not at all' or 'very little' support for the continuation of the status quo for the next five years. Again, this is firmly in line with the findings on satisfaction with the status quo: the Albanian respondents are much more dissatisfied with the status quo and would be very unwilling to see it continue.




3.3.2. Second scenario: De facto recognition from Serbia, and with extended executive powers for the Kosovo Serb Association/Community


Concerning this scenario, participants were asked the following question: Do you agree with granting extended executive powers for the Kosovo Serb Association/community provided that, in return, Serbia provides de facto recognition to Kosovo? About (15%) of the total sample either 'strongly agree' or 'somehow agree' with granting extended executive powers for Kosovo Serb Association/community provided that in return, Serbia provides de facto recognition to Kosovo. The majority of participants (81%), however, either 'somehow disagree' or 'strongly disagree' about granting extended executive powers for the Kosovo Serb Association/community.



Analysis of responses among Albanian and Serbian sample reveals highly contrasting patterns of responses. 11% among Albanians compared to 51% among Serbs either 'strongly agree' or 'somehow agree' about granting extended executive powers for the Kosovo Serb Association/community provided that in return, Serbia provides de facto recognition to Kosovo. In contrast, 87% among Albanians compared to 26% among Serbs either 'somehow disagree' or 'strongly disagree'. 2% among Albanians and 24% among Serbs 'do not know/do not have a view' on this issue.




With several follow-up questions, the survey sought to understand the underlying reasons why respondents did or did not agree with granting extended executive powers for the Kosovo Serb Association/community. Respondents who responded with either 'strongly agrees' or 'somewhat agree' with granting extended executive powers for Kosovo Serb Association/community, were asked the following questions (remember, 11% of the Albanian and 51% of the Serbian samples were exposed to these questions):



Among the Serbian respondents who were asked these particular follow-up questions, the reason most often given was 'it will give Serbs ... more say in the decision-making process', followed by 'it will improve the integration of Serbian community in Kosovo' whereas, among Albanian respondents, the reason most often given was 'it will improve the economic prosperity in Kosovo'.


Turning next to those respondents who responded with 'strongly disagree' or 'somehow disagree' with granting extended executive powers for Kosovo Serb Association/community, a different series of follow-up questions were posed (remember, 87% of the Albanian and 26% of the Serbian sample were exposed to these questions, so the number of Serb respondents answering these particular questions will be very small):




As can be seen, the Albanian respondents who were opposed to granting executive powers to the KSA strongly agreed that such powers might open the door for establishing a mini Republika Srpska, followed closely by concerns over entrenching divisions among communities in Kosovo and increased political tensions between Kosovo and Serbia.

3.3.3. Third scenario: Border adjustment between Kosovo and Serbia in return for global recognition of Kosovo, and open the path for UN membership

As far as this third scenario is concerned, respondents were asked the following question: If border adjustment between Kosovo and Serbia would result in the global recognition of Kosovo and open the path for UN membership, should Kosovo support such an agreement to adjust borders? 30% of the sample responded with Kosovo either 'definitely should' or 'probably should' support the border adjustment option (see the chart below). Conversely, 64% responded with Kosovo either 'probably should not' or 'definitely should not' support the border adjustment option. 5% 'do not know/do not have a view' on this issue.




A separate analysis of the Albanian and Serbian samples reveals a somewhat different pattern of responses, with somewhat higher support for this scenario among Serb respondents. Thus, 29% among Albanians and 40% among Serbs responded that Kosovo either 'definitely should' or 'probably should' support the border adjustment scenario if it resulted in the global recognition of Kosovo and opening the path for UN membership. Conversely, 67% among Albanians and 39% among Serbs responded that Kosovo either 'probably should not' or 'definitely should not' support the border adjustment scenario. 4% among Albanians and 22% among Serbs 'do not know/do not have a view' on this issue.




4. Do you support that the governments of Kosovo and Serbia should make every possible effort to reach a final agreement?

For more than a year, dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia has been halted following the 100% tariff of the Kosovo government on all Serbian and Bosnian goods. The international community has put increased pressure on lifting the tariff so that the dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia could continue, and a final agreement could be reached. Political actors in position and opposition remain divided whether Kosovo should make intensive efforts in reaching a final agreement with Serbia. Among the general public – vox populi - our findings show that 89% think the governments of Kosovo and Serbia ‘definitely should’ or ‘probably should’ make every possible effort to reach a final agreement. Only 9% responded that the governments of Kosovo and Serbia ‘definitely should not’ or ‘probably should not’ make every possible effort to reach a final agreement, and only 2% responded with ‘don’t know/don’t have a view’ on this issue. This would, therefore, appear to be a clear message from the public to political leaders.



However, the analysis of responses among the Albanian and Serbian samples reveals somewhat different patterns of responses. 92% among Albanians and 64% among Serbs responded to the governments of Kosovo and Serbia 'definitely should' or 'probably should' make every possible effort to reach a final agreement. 7% among Albanians and 22% among Serbs responded to the governments of Kosovo, and Serbia 'definitely should not' or 'probably should not' make every possible effort to reach a final agreement. 1% among Albanian and 15% Serbian respondents responded with 'do not know/do not have a view on this' issue. The cross-tabulation analysis shows that Albanian (66%) and Serbian (49%) respondents who support the restart of dialogue are also likely to support the governments of Kosovo and Serbia in making efforts to reach to a final agreement.



5. The structure of attitudes

It is also of considerable interest to explore the overall structure of respondents' attitudes towards the different topics covered in the sections above. Are people consistently favourable or opposed to issues such as restarting the dialogue, border adjustment in order to reach an agreement, and eventual unification with Albania, or do they change their opinions from one topic to another?

Using techniques such as correlational and factor analysis we can look at the inter-relationships between all the different measures – attitudes to restarting the dialogue, making every effort to complete the negotiations, continuation of the status quo for another five years, the three scenarios, and unification with Albanian in the event of achieving recognition – that we have reported above.

When we do this analysis, *the first pattern* that we find is very clear, although perhaps unsurprising: Respondents who are dissatisfied with the status quo are unlikely to support its continuation for 5 more years. They also tend believe that the government should restart the dialogue and should make every effort to find a solution. Vice versa, respondents who are satisfied with the status quo are likely to support its continuation for the next five years, to disagree with restarting the dialogue, and opposed to great efforts being made to secure a resolution. These

four attitudes tend to go closely together, either for or against. In other words, knowing how a respondent feels about one of these topics is a pretty good guide to how they feel about the other three topics in this cluster. There is considerable consistency in people's attitudes on these four specific issues.

The second pattern is for attitudes towards granting executive power for the KSA, and border adjustment in order to achieve global recognition to go quite closely with each other. Attitudes towards this cluster of issues are not, however, at all closely related to attitudes towards the first cluster. In other words, knowing whether someone is unhappy with the status quo or supports restarting the dialogue is not a good guide to what their views will be about the granting executive powers to the KSA, or adjusting borders. This means that people who are in favour of restarting the dialogue have a variety of viewpoints about what concessions, if any, should be allowed in the course of the dialogue. In effect, people may agree on the need to restart the dialogue but disagree on what arrangements between Serbia and Kosovo should be made.

It is notable that these issues, such as the KSA and border adjustments, are all ones on which the Serbian respondents tend to be more supportive than the Albanian respondents. Thus, as was shown above, Serbian respondents were somewhat more in favour of granting executive powers to the KSA and adjusting the borders. The structure of attitudes is the same in both the Albanian and Serbian communities, with similar patterns on these issues within each community. In a sense, this cluster of issues could be interpreted as indicating how cooperative or conflictual people are in their orientations/visions.

The third pattern, or rather the absence of any strong pattern, is that attitudes towards unification with Albania tend to stand apart from attitudes towards all the other issues. Unification is not closely aligned with any of the other issues. To put it another way, people who support unification are almost equally likely to be drawn from those who are satisfied with the status quo and those who are dissatisfied, and from those who favour border adjustment and those who do not.

It appears to be a stand-alone issue that does not fit closely with either the first or the second cluster of issues.

The table below summarizes the structure of attitudes. It shows how the first cluster of attitudes are all strongly related to what might be termed a 'change approach' strand of public opinion, whereas the second cluster relates strongly to what could be termed a 'cooperation' or 'mutual adjustment' strand, while attitudes towards unification stand more or less alone.¹⁰

	Change approach	Mutual adjustment	Unification
(Dis)Satisfaction with status quo	0.75	0.14	0.16
Finding agreement	0.75	-0.05	0.03
(Dis)Continuation of the status quo	0.77	0.19	0.00
Restarting the Dialogue	0.68	-0.10	-0.27
Executive powers for the KSA	0.24	0.70	-0.02
Border adjustment	0.02	0.71	-0.20
Unification with Albania	0.04	-0.07	0.90

Overall, then analysis allows us to distinguish two main clusters of attitudes. **Within** each cluster, people tend to have rather consistent attitudes, but it is a different story **between** clusters: knowing where someone stands on issues within the first cluster is not a good guide to where they will stand on issues within the second cluster. Thus, people may agree on the need to restart the dialogue and to make every effort to achieve a resolution, but disagree on what particular arrangements should be made between Serbia and Kosovo.

6. Comparative analysis

In this section, we analyse the repeated cross-sectional data and compare some of the main results from the first, second, and third surveys. The first survey was conducted in December 2018, the second in May 2019, and third by the end of January 2020. The second and third surveys aimed to explore more in-depth the

¹⁰ The table shows the loadings of the individual items in a rotated factor analysis with three factors.


scenarios on the 'grand finale' between Kosovo and Serbia. The second and third surveys are identical and, in many respects, resemble the first survey, which has a similar methodology, method for selection of municipalities, and selection of sample (although it did not include the reasons for the respondents' responses). Adjustments for variations between the three surveys in the age and gender profiles of the samples have been carried out in order to ensure comparability. See below some of the main questions and comparative analysis:

a) Restarting the dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia?

Since the dialogue had been halted for more than a year, we slightly changed the question as compared to Surveys 1 and 2. Whereas in the first two surveys, the question was posed as: "Do you agree with the halting of dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia?" in the third survey, the question was rephrased as "Would you support restarting of dialogue between the governments of Kosovo and Serbia?"

In order to make the answers to these different questions comparable across the three surveys, we express them in terms of whether respondents had positive or negative attitudes towards the dialogue. (Thus respondents to the first two surveys who did not wish to continue the dialogue, and respondents to the third survey who did not wish to restart the dialogue, are regarded as having negative opinions.)

In the first survey, well over half the respondents (62%) were positive about the dialogue and favoured its continuation. This proportion fell back in the second survey (to 50%), but in the third survey, an even larger majority (70%) had positive views and favoured restarting the dialogue. These trends across the three surveys were broadly similar among both the Albanian and Serbian samples. The diagram shows the trend across the three surveys in Albanian and Serbian samples.




b) Should Kosovo seek unification with Albania if it is recognized by Serbia?

Turning next to the issue of unification with Albania, we find that opinion has been quite volatile across the three surveys. From a figure of about 43% in the first survey, support for unification rose to around 53% in the second survey but then dropped back to about 38% in the third survey.¹¹ Further analysis reveals that the support for unification has been consistently much lower among the Serbian samples than among the Albanian samples, although the trends over time are somewhat similar. It should be noted that throughout there has been a high number of responses among Serbian respondents who 'do not know/do not have a view' about this issue throughout (18% in Survey 1 – 24% in Survey 2 – 43% in Survey 3).

These changes over time are all statistically significant ($p < 0.01$), and since the question is asked identically in the three surveys, we can have more confidence in the result. It remains true; however, that opinion remains rather evenly divided between unification with Albania and maintaining the two-state status quo. The balance of opinion has shifted, but not decisively so. It may well be that the


¹¹ Note that any discrepancy between chart and the numbers in the table is attributed to the decimal points.

volatility of opinion is because unification remains at present a hypothetical issue, and people have not yet formed definite opinions either way.



c) Three alternative scenarios for an eventual deal between Kosovo and Serbia


Regarding the scenario – **status quo** – comparison of results shows that dissatisfaction with the current status quo between Kosovo and Serbia increased between the first and second surveys, and remains very high in the third survey (79% in Survey 1 – 89% in Survey 2 – 86% in Survey 1). Continuing high levels of dissatisfaction are particularly marked among the Albanian samples (82% in Survey 1 – 91% in Survey 2 – 90% in Survey 3), but there tends to be a much lower level of dissatisfaction, and greater volatility, in the Serbian samples (51% in Survey 1 – 71% in Survey 2 – 44% in Survey 3). Once again, the changes are statistically significant ($p < 0.01$). One possible interpretation of this finding is that, the longer the stalemate continues with several unresolved issues remaining, the greater is the population’s frustration at the lack of progress. See the diagram below for result comparison across three surveys.




Scenario – **granting extended executive powers for the Kosovo Serb Association/community provided that in return Serbia provides de facto recognition to Kosovo** – overall the results show that there continues to be overwhelming opposition to granting extended executive powers with over four-fifths of each sample being against this scenario (85% in Survey 1 – 86% in Survey 2 – 81% in Survey 3). However, there are contrasting results among the Albanian and Serbian samples. The Albanian samples show a stable high level of opposition to executive powers for the KSA (87% in Survey 1 – 92% in Survey 2 – 87% in Survey 3). In contrast, the Serbian samples show a significant decline in opposition to the scenario and a commensurate increase in support for extended executive powers for the KSA. Support for the proposal rises from 17% in Survey 1 to 48% in Survey 2 and 49% in Survey 3. This means that there has been increased polarization between the Albanian and Serbian communities concerning this scenario.

We must remember that the samples of Serb respondents are quite small (around 100 respondents in each of the three surveys). However, the increased proportion of the Serb samples in the second and third surveys, which support extended executive powers for the KSA, is statistically significant ($p < 0.01$). There does, therefore, appear to be a real increase in the extent of polarization between the

two communities on this issue. This may once again reflect frustration at the unresolved issues between Serbia and Kosovo.



Scenario – **border adjustment between Kosovo and Serbia would result in the global recognition of Kosovo and open the path for UN membership** – the overall result is that the proportion supporting this scenario has remained relatively stable (29% in Survey 1 – 33% in Survey 2 – 31% in Survey 3). The support among the Albanian samples is stable (28% Survey 1 – 33% in Survey 2 – 30% in Survey 3). However, there appears to be increased support among Serbs (28% Survey 1 – 33% in Survey 2 – 39% in Survey 3), although these changes are at the borderline of statistical significance ($p = 0.04$). It should also be noted that there have been quite large proportions of the Serb samples (21% in Survey 3) who ‘do not know/do not have a view’.



7. Conclusions

The aim of this third survey, as with the two preceding surveys, was to understand the perceptions and attitudes of citizens (*Vox Populi*) regarding possible scenarios for a final agreement between Kosovo and Serbia. With a total of 1107 respondents in our survey (90% Albanians, 8% Serbs, and 2% from other ethnic groups), our sample is nationally representative of the Kosovo population. Conducted at the end of January 2020, this third survey repeats many questions from the first and second surveys, which were conducted in December 2018 and May 2019, respectively. It thus enables us to examine changes over the last twelve months. Additionally, this and the prior (second) survey included some additional questions exploring in more depth people's reasons for their preferences.

In many respects, the present survey replicates and confirms the findings from the first and second surveys as well as making some new contributions. In particular, we find that:

- Just as in the first and second surveys, there is strong support among both communities (but particularly strong support among the Albanian community) for restarting the dialogue.
- Both communities (but especially the Albanian community) believe that the government should make every possible effort to reach a final agreement – a new finding.

- Just as in the first and second surveys, there is considerable dissatisfaction with the status quo among the Albanian community whereas the Serbian community has more mixed views about the continuation of the status quo;
- Just as in the first and second surveys, there is very little support in the Albanian community for granting extended executive powers to the KSA. A new finding, however, is that a majority of the Serb community now support granting extended executive powers to the KSA;
- Just as in the first and second surveys, there is a modest amount of support in both communities for border adjustments with Serbia, providing that this brings global recognition, although supporters for this scenario are outnumbered by opponents.

However, while the overall outlines have changed little, there are several indications of what might be interpreted as increasing frustration with the lack of progress in resolving the outstanding issues between Kosovo and Serbia. There is also worrying evidence of polarization between the two communities over executive powers for the KSA. There is a danger that divisions between the two communities will become increasingly entrenched.

Turning to the follow-up questions which asked respondents about their reasons, the results remained similar to those we obtained in the second survey. As in the second survey, we found substantial differences in the reasoning of the two communities. In the case of the *first scenario*, - dissatisfaction with the status quo, Albanian respondents were particularly likely to cite the absence of concrete moves towards European integration as their reason for dissatisfaction (85%). This was followed closely by lack of global recognition (75%), lack of economic prosperity (62%), lack of a solution to internal problems between the two communities (60%), and lack of peaceful relations with Serbia (57%). In contrast, Serbian respondents had very different priorities and focused on the unresolved internal problems (50%) and the lack of peaceful relations with Serbia (23%).

In the case of the *second scenario*, namely giving executive powers to the KSA, the Serbian respondents who favoured this scenario were particularly likely to give

as their reason 'more say in the decision-making process' (68%). Other frequently cited reasons among Serbs, although some way behind, concerned the integration of the Serbian community in Kosovo (49%) and better relationships with Serbia (34%).

The Albanian respondents who were opposed to granting executive powers to the KSA focussed on very different reasons. They strongly agreed that such powers might open the door for establishing a mini Republika Srpska (86%). This was followed closely by concerns that divisions between communities in Kosovo would become entrenched (84%), and the risk of increased political tensions between Kosovo and Serbia (79%).

Turning to the *third scenario*, border adjustment in return for global recognition, there is some support among the Albanian community (30%) and more so in the Serbian community (40%). It seems that support for this scenario has not significantly changed among Albanians, but it has significantly increased among Serbs.

Overall, then, the perspectives of the two communities continue to differ quite fundamentally in several respects: thus, the Serb respondents are particularly concerned about internal issues affecting the Serb community in Kosovo. In contrast, the Albanian respondents were more likely to express concerns about external issues such as integration with the EU and global recognition, although they were also very worried about the risk of creating a mini Republika Srpska. These differing perspectives do not, however, necessarily rule out an agreement. EU integration does not in itself imply any specific solution for the internal issues within Kosovo. The challenge is to find solutions that go some way to meeting the objectives of both communities.

In conclusion, a vital aspect of the new findings is the contrast between the strong support for reaching an agreement and the absence of majority support for any of the three specific scenarios that have been put forward. This is particularly marked among the Albanian community who are highly dissatisfied with the

status quo, but unconvinced about any of the alternative scenarios that have been put forward.

More detailed analysis shows that public attitudes to the status quo to restarting the dialogue and finding a solution tend to be rather consistent. People who are dissatisfied with the current situation are also highly likely to want to restart the dialogue and to want the government to make every effort to reach an agreement with Serbia. This is the *vox populi* of the Albanian community. The Albanian community clearly speaks up for change.

In contrast, there is no clear message from the people on how to achieve change, either from the Albanian community or from the Serb community. In one sense, one could say that this is why there is a stalemate – each of the three scenarios has notable downsides in the view of public opinion. Nevertheless, at the same time, this does not rule out the possibility of public support for an agreement brokered by the USA and Europe. Given the public keenness to end the stalemate and to secure international recognition and European integration, public support could well follow an agreement that achieved these three goals. An agreement that achieved these goals, for all of which there is widespread public support, could well be successful.

